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Abstract 
Fixed-up-to (FUT) pricing allows consumers to purchase a fixed usage amount of an information 
service for a certain fixed price chosen from a set of options. In this study, we derive an optimal 
analytical solution for FUT pricing without imposing the strong single-crossing assumption. Further, 
we illustrate the analytical solution by leveraging mixed integer nonlinear programming to derive an 
optimal FUT pricing scheme for information services and also investigate when and by how much 
FUT pricing improves upon commonly used “flat rate” pricing. Our numerical results show that FUT 
pricing improves the service provider’s profits while enhancing social welfare when consumers face 
different maximum consumption-level bounds. Notably, in terms of optimal pricing, our numerical 
results show that the consumers’ maximum consumption-level bounds are more important than their 
utility functions. Most importantly, our results show that FUT pricing performs better than flat rate 
pricing under conditions of incomplete information. Finally, we empirically show that it is not 
necessary to treat over-the-limit rates as a decision variable in terms of optimal FUT pricing since 
both FUT pricing and three-part tariffs are reasonable approximations of nonlinear pricing in terms 
of both firm profits and social welfare. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and practical 
implications for the design of optimal FUT pricing in terms of enhancing firm profits, consumer 
surplus, and social welfare.  
Keywords: Pricing, Nonlinear Mixed Integer Programming, Information Services, Fixed-Up-To 
(FUT) Pricing. 
Hsing Kenneth Cheng was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on January 19, 2017, and 
underwent three revisions.  
1. Introduction 
Identifying the best pricing strategies for information 
services is a major problem for firms, given the wide 
variety of information services available, such as on-
demand web services, mobile services, voice, cellular 
data, SMS/MMS, and cable TV. One of the most 
salient and unique characteristics of information 
services is that with enough capacity, the marginal cost 
of offering information services is negligible (near-
zero or zero). Thus, flat rate pricing is a more attractive 
strategy for firms than usage-based pricing (e.g., Oi, 
1971; Fishburn, Odlyzko, & Siders, 1997; Essegaier, 
Gupta, & Zhang, 2002; Randhawa & Kumar, 2008; 
Wu & Banker, 2010; Cachon & Feldman, 2011). 
However, a relatively recent pricing scheme that is 
increasingly used by information service providers in 
practice is termed “fixed-up-to (FUT)” pricing. For 
example, Verizon Wireless offers cellular data plans 
using FUT pricing options of $30 (1GB), $45 (3GB), 
$60 (6GB), $80 (12GB); Disney Cruise Lines offers 
onboard Internet plans offering plans at $19 (100MB), 
Optimal Fixed-Up-To Pricing for Information Services  
 
1448 
$39 (300MB), $89 (1000MB). 1  FUT pricing is 
different from flat rate pricing, traditional pure usage-
based pricing (without a subscription fee), and two-
part tariff pricing (usage-based pricing plus a 
subscription fee) in that FUT pricing allows consumers 
to select their desired level of consumption from a 
“menu” of price options.  
FUT pricing has a number of benefits for both firms 
and consumers, compared to usage-based pricing. FUT 
pricing reduces utility variance by bundling plan units, 
thus satisfying diverse consumer needs and potentially 
enhancing firm profits. FUT pricing also has a key 
advantage over flat rate pricing; by having more than 
one price point, FUT pricing also allows firms to 
efficiently accommodate heterogeneous consumer 
needs, potentially increasing total social welfare 
(combination of firm profit and consumer surplus). 
However, since FUT menu pricing is generally more 
difficult than flat rate pricing to implement in practice, 
it is useful to understand “when” and “by how much” 
FUT pricing can perform better than flat rate pricing in 
terms of firm profits, consumer surplus, and social 
welfare. Therefore, we aim at deriving an optimal 
solution for FUT menu pricing to both extend the 
literature on the pricing of information services and 
also to enhance managerial practice by testing our 
model with sophisticated analytical and empirical 
techniques.  
FUT menu pricing resembles traditional quantity 
discount pricing for physical goods (e.g., Monahan, 
1984; Lee & Rosenblatt, 1986; Munson & Rosenblatt, 
1998; Corbett & Groote, 2000; Shin & Benton, 2004) 
in the sense that the unit price for a larger plan is often 
discounted. However, in contrast to its popularity for 
information services, flat rate pricing is not as popular 
for physical goods, perhaps because of the positive 
marginal cost associated with each unit of a physical 
good. As a result, despite the practical importance of 
optimally pricing information services to maximize 
firm profit while minimizing deadweight loss, there is 
no clear guidance from the literature on quantity 
discounts that firms can use to determine when to use 
flat rate pricing versus FUT pricing. In managerial 
practice, many firms indeed struggle to find the best 
strategies to price their information services, 
evidenced by the wide variety of pricing strategies 
used by various firms. For example, Cox 
 
1 Please note that the respective plan unit in a FUT plan for 
information services could, for example, be usage time for 
cell phone services, traffic volume for data transmission 
services, number of trades for online discount brokers, or the 
number of messages for  short messaging services (SMS) / 
multimedia messaging services (MMS). 
2 In this study, we do not consider usage-based pricing; not 
only are flat rate pricing and FUT pricing the most popular 
pricing schemes for information services, but flat rate pricing 
Communications charges a monthly flat rate for its 
Internet services. Netflix similarly uses a monthly flat 
rate pricing for its unlimited streaming service. In 
contrast, Celebrity Cruises uses FUT pricing menu for 
onboard Internet access, while Verizon Wireless uses 
FUT pricing for its cellular data service.  
However, it remains unclear how the design of FUT 
pricing menus can be optimized, and the effects of 
FUT pricing on firm profits and consumer surplus have 
not been adequately examined in either theory or 
practice.2 In this study, we aim to derive an optimal 
FUT pricing strategy for monopoly information 
service providers. In practice, there are numerous 
monopoly information service providers. For example, 
leading social networking sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter have secured a unique monopoly position for 
the types of information services they offer. While 
many of these sites currently offer their services to 
consumers free of charge, the strategic reasons for 
doing so perhaps are to attract traffic, build network 
externalities, and adopt an advertising-supported 
business model. They may decide to charge consumers 
for their services in the future.3 Another example is 
Gogo Inflight Internet, which has successfully created 
a monopoly environment on airplanes, since 
passengers on most airlines do not have access to any 
other Internet services while flying. Similarly, Internet 
services offered on many cruise ships are examples of 
monopoly information services providers. In the area 
of online auctions, eBay is a local monopolist. In 
multiple regions that offer a single cable TV provider, 
cable companies also enjoy monopoly power, and are 
often criticized for poor services and skyrocketing 
rates. Therefore, the assumption of a monopoly 
information service provider is valid in many practical 
real-life contexts.  
In the literature on the pricing of information services, 
Masuda and Whang (2006) were among the first to 
analytically study FUT pricing. However, although 
they analytically derived an optimal FUT menu for two 
types of consumers, they had to employ a strict single-
crossing assumption. While this assumption is 
convenient for analytical work, it is unlikely to hold in 
practice, as the authors acknowledge (p. 252). In the 
current study, we extend the pricing literature by 
analytically demonstrating that FUT pricing could be 
more profitable even when the single-crossing 
has been determined to be generally superior to usage-based 
pricing for monopoly information service providers (e.g., Oi, 
1971; Fishburn et al., 1997; Essegaier et al., 2002; Randhawa 
& Kumar, 2008; Wu & Banker, 2010; Cachon & Feldman, 
2011). 
3 In 2009, for example, Twitter Japan considered charging its 
customers a subscription fee to use the service 
http://techcrunch.com/2009/11/27/6-reasons-why-twitter-
japans-subscription-model-might-work-in-japan/ 
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assumption does not hold. Then, we include consumer 
heterogeneity assumptions in our general model and 
use a mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP) to 
identify the optimal FUT pricing strategy for 
information services. By using a numerical solution 
approach, we can examine the performance of FUT 
pricing in typical practical scenarios that are not 
tractable analytically, such as scenarios without the 
strict single-crossing assumption and those with more 
than two consumer types. We then extend the pricing 
literature by examining the performance of FUT 
pricing not only in terms of firm profits, but also in 
terms of consumer surplus and social welfare.  
Information service providers seldom understand the 
exact nature of their consumers’ utilities in practice, 
and this uncertainty is best captured by utility 
distribution forecasts. While it is possible for an 
information service provider to amply forecast some 
general consumer utility distributions, identifying 
precise consumer utilities is very costly in practice. We 
thus examine the value of complete information 
concerning consumer utility on the performance of 
FUT pricing, while our MINLP numerical solution 
provides direct insight into this important and practical 
topic.   
Finally, following Masuda and Whang (2006), we 
initially assume that all FUT consumers will stay 
within their allowed usage amounts most of the time. 
Masuda and Whang argue that over-the-limit rates do 
not play a critical role, as long as they are high enough. 
In practice, high over-the-limit rates are used as a 
penalty for over-the-limit usage, and they are typically 
at least 3-4 times more than the average rates of the 
allotted plan (e.g., in Verizon Wireless plans). We 
question whether this practice is a good idea or whether 
firms should also treat over-the-limit rates as decision 
variables and employ a “three-part tariff”—comprising 
plan price, usage allotment, and an over-the-limit rate. 
We conclude our analysis by examining how FUT 
pricing and a three-part tariff perform compared to a 
nonlinear pricing scheme, in which each usage level is 
charged a different and nonlinear price.  
In sum, the following research questions guide our 
study: 
1. When is FUT pricing a better option (compared 
to the popular flat rate pricing), and by how 
much? Simply knowing whether FUT pricing is 
better may not be sufficient because FUT menu 
pricing is generally more difficult to implement 
in practice. 
2. If consumers have heterogeneous preferences, 
how well does FUT pricing perform over flat 
rate pricing in terms of overall social welfare 
(firm profits combined with consumer surplus)? 
3. Does incomplete information really matter for 
FUT pricing? Or conversely, how much is 
complete information about consumer utility 
worth in terms of FUT pricing?  
4. Should firms treat over-the-limit rates as 
decision variables, and how do FUT pricing and 
three-part tariffs perform, as compared to 
nonlinear pricing schemes? 
Our results indicate that for optimal FUT menu 
pricing, the maximum consumption-level bound is 
more important than the consumers’ utility functions. 
In our study, regardless of their utility functions, when 
consumers have different maximum consumption-
level bounds, FUT pricing dominates flat rate pricing 
in terms of both the firm’s profits and social welfare. 
Our results also show that FUT pricing clearly 
dominates flat rate pricing under incomplete 
information, and that FUT pricing performs equally 
well as the three-part tariff in terms of both firm profits 
and social welfare, which are both reasonably good 
approximations of nonlinear pricing. Taken together, 
this study contributes to the pricing literature on 
information services by guiding the design of FUT 
pricing and showing its positive effects on firm profits 
and social welfare. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
literature on the pricing of information services. 
Section 3 presents our base model formulation, 
followed by the general model in Section 4. We present 
numerical results and case analyses in Section 5, 
followed by implications for theory and practice in 
Section 6. 
2. Literature Review 
We review the pricing literature in the context of 
information services, starting with the earlier literature 
on computer services in the early 1980s, followed by 
networked and Internet services in the 1990s, and 
concluding with some relevant research on information 
services in the late 1990s and 2000s.  
Early on, Mendelson (1985) and Mendelson and 
Whang (1990) used queuing models in the pricing of 
computer services. Dewan and Mendelson (1990) 
studied congestion pricing with user delay costs in 
service facilities. Also, Stahl and Whinston (1994) 
developed an economic model for client-server 
computing pricing with priority classes, while 
MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) used dynamic 
auctions to price the Internet. Dewan (1996) examined 
the computer service pricing under a variety of control 
structures. However, none of these studies considered 
FUT pricing for the pricing of IT-related services.  
Gupta, Stahl, and Whinston (1996, 1997) developed an 
optimal pricing model for networked services. In their 
model, the authors ensured that incoming service 
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requests could only be submitted when their utility is 
higher than the congestion-based price and loss of 
utility (such as additional waiting cost) imposed on the 
job requests already in the system. Gupta, Jukic, 
Parameswaran, Stahl, and Whinston (1997) and Gupta, 
Jukic, Stahl, and Whinston (2000) combined a 
congestion pricing scheme and demand estimation to 
ensure that their pricing scheme is incentive 
compatible. Konana, Gupta, and Whinston (2000) 
studied dynamic priority pricing and showed that it 
outperforms other priority rules. Nadiminti, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Kriebel (2002) studied resource 
allocation with asymmetric information and negative 
externalities. Afeche and Mendelson (2004) developed 
a novel generalized delay cost model that is 
interdependent of consumer value. Bhargava and Sun 
(2008) examined how performance-contingent pricing 
schemes with long-term statistical performance 
guarantees can be applied to many IT services. Finally, 
Gupta, Jukic, Stahl, and Whinston (2011) studied long-
term network capacity investments under different 
pricing strategies. Again, all these studies mostly 
focused on congestion-based negative externality 
pricing and did not consider FUT pricing.  
Extending the literature on the pricing of IT-related 
services (e.g., computing and networked), several 
recent studies have examined different popular pricing 
schemes specifically for information services. The 
most relevant studies to our work are Fishburn et al. 
(1997), Essegaier et al. (2002), Sundararajan (2004) 
and Masuda and Whang (2006). Fishburn et al. (1997) 
studied flat rate and usage-based pricing, and they 
showed that flat rate pricing is generally better than 
usage-based pricing for a monopoly information 
service provider. Nevertheless, they simplified their 
analytical model with some quite restrictive 
assumptions. For instance, they assumed that 
consumers decide on the amount of the information 
service they want to buy and stick to it before checking 
the price, which is unlikely to apply in practice. 
However, it is not clear whether their results would 
generalize to the more general downward sloping 
demand functions, which are considered in this study 
for FUT pricing. Essegaier et al. (2002) also 
considered flat rate pricing and usage-based pricing, 
and they showed that flat rate pricing is a sustainable 
pricing structure once the industry has sufficient 
capacity. However, as in Fishburn et al. (1997), they 
also assumed that consumer usage is inelastic to price 
changes. In addition, the authors assumed that both 
heavy and light consumers have the same total 
reservation price for the same service. This could be a 
questionable assumption, as consumers usually have 
quite different and diminishing marginal utility for 
each unit of information service they use. Although 
they extended their model by adopting the same unit 
reservation price for these two consumer types, their 
assumption still did not capture the fact that consumers 
usually have different and diminishing marginal utility 
for each unit of service they use. We explicitly include 
consumer heterogeneity and diminishing marginal 
utilities in our model. Sundararajan (2004) considered 
fixed-fee and nonlinear usage-based pricing to show 
that when there are contract administration costs, a 
monopoly service provider can increase its profits by 
offering fixed-fee pricing coupled with usage-based 
pricing. Still, while they suggested that a service 
provider could increase its profits by adopting two 
pricing schemes simultaneously, the results were 
solely based on a utility function that satisfied the 
Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property (Fudenberg 
& Tirole, 1993), which enabled the service provider to 
segment consumers profitably through consumer self-
selection. However, if the single-crossing property 
does not hold, it is not clear if the two schemes together 
would enhance profits.  
In the literature, Masuda and Whang (2006) were 
among the first to analytically study FUT pricing. 
Their seminal paper inaugurated a literature on the 
pricing of information services, which includes work 
by Choudhary (2010), Huang and Sundararajan 
(2011), and Bagh and Bhargava (2013), among others. 
However, although Masuda and Whang analytically 
derived an optimal FUT menu for two types of 
consumers, they had to employ the strict single-
crossing assumption. While this assumption is 
convenient for analytical work, it is unlikely to hold in 
practice, as the authors do acknowledge (p. 252). 
Extending Masuda and Whang, we first seek to 
analytically show that FUT pricing could be more 
profitable, even when the single-crossing assumption 
does not hold. Second, by including consumer 
heterogeneity assumptions in our general model, we 
also use a mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP) 
to identify the optimal FUT pricing strategy for 
information services. One of the major contributions of 
our general model is its ability to accommodate many 
types of consumers without any auxiliary consumer 
utility assumption, notably the single-crossing 
property. 
3. The Base Model 
We first construct the base model for the FUT pricing 
problem. We assume there are only two types of 
consumers in the market; this assumption is relaxed in 
the next section with a more general model. Suppose 
there are  high-type and (1-) low-type consumers, 
and the firm cannot distinguish between these two 
types of consumers (i.e., third-degree price 
discrimination is not possible in practice, and the firm 
has to go with second-degree price discrimination 
based on consumer self-selection).  
Following Wu and Banker (2010), since consumers 
have limited time, energy, attention, and diminishing 
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marginal utility, we assume that they face certain upper 
bounds when using information services, and their 
utility will typically stay the same beyond these 
bounds. This is a reasonable assumption, as virtually 
all information services have this property and no 
consumer can continue to consume a service without 
limit. For example, consumers cannot consume a time-
based information service, such as voice 
communication, for more than 24 hours a day. Given 
limited transmission rates of the device used, traffic 
volume in each period is also naturally bounded for any 
data transmission service. SMS/MMS has the same 
property, as the number of uses in each period is 
bounded by the total time available given a positive 
time requirement for each use. 
The high-type consumer has the utility of UH for the 
service at and beyond her maximum consumption-
level bound LH, which is greater than the utility, UL, of 
a low-type consumer for the service at and beyond her 
maximum consumption-level bound LL. In other 
words, we assume UH > UL and LH > LL. Building upon 
previous literature, we first assume a consumer’s 
utility for the service within her maximum 
consumption-level bound increases linearly from 0 to 
UH or UL, though we will relax this assumption in the 
general model as well. 
Following Fishburn et al. (1997), Sundararajan (2004), 
and Wu and Banker (2010), we assume that the 
marginal cost of offering the information service is 
negligible; in the pricing literature, the marginal cost 
of information services is often modeled as negligible 
because system capacity is usually fixed and cannot be 
changed in the short term. A firm only faces a large 
“marginal cost” when it needs to increase capacity, but 
this is a separate long-term investment decision a firm 
would make; with a new larger capacity, the marginal 
cost would again become negligible. As such, it can be 
assumed that the short-term marginal costs of the 
information service provider can always be kept 
negligible. Capacity constraints, in fact, are more 
likely to affect flat rate pricing where capacity demand 
is likely to be higher. 
Given that there are only two types of consumers 
(high-type and low-type), the firm will offer, at most 
two FUT plans: one plan with price PH and plan units 
TH, which is intended to be sold to high-type 
consumers, and a second plan with price PL and plan 
units TL to be sold to low-type consumers. For 
simplicity, we write these two plans as (PH., TH) and 
(PL, TL). Since consumers have the same utility beyond 
their maximum consumption-level bound, it is not 
necessary to design plans beyond those consumption 
bounds. In other words, we should have: 𝑃𝐻 ≤ 𝑈𝐻 , 
𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝐿 , 𝑇𝐻 ≤ 𝐿𝐻  and 𝑇𝐿 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 . It is also reasonable 
that 𝑃𝐻 ≥ 𝑃𝐿  and 𝑇𝐻 ≥ 𝑇𝐿 .  
Following these assumptions, a high-type consumer 
will realize a net surplus 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
− 𝑃𝐻 from buying (PH, 
TH); and realize a net surplus 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐻
− 𝑃𝐿 from buying 
(PL, TL), since we assume a consumer’s utility for the 
service within the maximum consumption-level bound 
increases linearly from 0. We can then derive the 
firm’s optimal strategy. Assuming that these two plans 
(PH, TH) and (PL, TL) are offered, a high-type consumer 
will buy (PH, TH), if and only if, her net surplus from 
buying (PH, TH) is greater than that yielded by not 
buying any plan (zero utility) or from buying (PL, TL). 
That is, the following two constraints must hold for the 
high-type consumer to buy (PH, TH) : 
 
𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
− 𝑃𝐻 ≥ 0 → 𝑃𝐻 ≤ 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
 
(1) H prefers buying (PH, TH) to not buying any plan; 
𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
− 𝑃𝐻 ≥ 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐻
− 𝑃𝐿 → 𝑃𝐻 ≤ 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻 − 𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐻
+ 𝑃𝐿  
(2) H prefers buying (PH, TH) to buying (PL, TL). 
Similarly, for a low-type consumer to buy (PL, TL), we 
must assure the consumer that the net surplus from 
buying (PL, TL) is greater than that from not buying at 
all (zero utility) and from buying (PH, TH). That is, the 
following two constraints must hold for the low-type 
consumer to buy (PL, TL): 
 
𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
− 𝑃𝐿 ≥ 0 → 𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 
(3) L prefers buying (PL, TL) to 
not buying; 
𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
− 𝑃𝐿 ≥ 𝑈𝐿min {
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐿
, 1} − 𝑃𝐻 → 𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑈𝐿[min {
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐿
, 1} −
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
] 
(4) L prefers buying (PL, TL) to 
buying (PH, TH). 
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Figure 1. With Single Crossing Property 
 
It is in the firm’s interest to increase these prices as 
much as possible; thus, in general, one of the first two 
above inequalities, (1) and (2), will be binding, and one 
of the latter two above inequalities, (3) and (4), will 
also be binding.  
When 
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
>
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 (with single-crossing property; see 
Figure 1), by using proof by contradiction, we can 
show that constraints (2) and (3) are binding: 
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻 − 𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐻
+ 𝑃𝐿  
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 
The firm’s profit function is thus: 
𝜋 = 𝛼𝑃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝐿
= 𝛼 (𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻 − 𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐻
+ 𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
)
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 
The firm will then choose TH and TL to maximize its 
profit. Since: 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑇𝐻
= 𝛼 (
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
) > 0, it is optimal that TH 
= LH. In addition, 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑇𝐿
= −𝛼
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
+
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
. When −𝛼
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
+
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
< 0 (i.e., there are many high-type consumers as: 
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
>
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
), TL = 0 = PL is optimal. In other words, the 
firm’s optimal strategy is to focus on high-type 
consumers only and offer flat rate pricing at 𝑃𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻 
(i.e., leave low-type consumers out of the market). 
However, when −𝛼
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
+
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
≥ 0  (i.e., there are not 
enough high-type consumers, as 
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
>
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
), TL = LL is 
optimal. In other words, the firm’s optimal strategy 
would be to provide two FUT plans (PH, TH) and (PL, 
TL): 
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻 − 𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐻
+ 𝑈𝐿 
𝑇𝐻 = 𝐿𝐻 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑈𝐿 
𝑇𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿 
Proposition 1 (with single-crossing property, 
𝑼𝑯
𝑳𝑯
>
𝑼𝑳
𝑳𝑳
): 
When α is small enough, so that −𝛼
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
+
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
≥ 0, 
the optimal strategy for the firm is to offer two 
FUT plans: (PH, TH) = (𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻−𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐻
+ 𝑈𝐿, 𝐿𝐻) and 
(PL, TL) = (𝑈𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿). Otherwise, flat rate pricing 
would be superior. 
While Proposition 1 is similar to Masuda and Whang’s 
(2006) Theorem 1, we used it to lay the theoretical 
comparison basis for Propositions 2 and 3 below. The 
strong assumption of Masuda and Whang’s Theorem 1 
is the single-crossing assumption. Masuda and Whang 
state that “this single-crossing assumption is 
admittedly strong, but standard in the mechanism 
design literature, because it significantly simplifies the 
notation and analysis (Fudenberg & Tirole 1993),” (p. 
248); that “Theorem 1 depends heavily on the single-
crossing properties of valuation functions Vi ” (p. 250); 
and that “in particular, the single-crossing assumption 
is unlikely to hold” (p. 252). 
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Figure 2. Without the Single Crossing Property 
 
On the other hand, when 
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
≤
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 (without single-
crossing property; see Figure 2), we can show that, 
through proof by contradiction, the constraints (1) and 
(2) are binding: 
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 
The firm’s profit function is thus given by: 
𝜋 = 𝛼𝑃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼𝑈𝐻
𝑇𝐻
𝐿𝐻
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝑈𝐿
𝑇𝐿
𝐿𝐿
 
In this case, the firm will then choose TH and TL to 
maximize its profit. Since 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑇𝐻
= 𝛼 (
𝑈𝐻
𝐿𝐻
) > 0, TH = LH 
is optimal. Similarly, since 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑇𝐿
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑈𝐿
𝐿𝐿
> 0, TL = 
LL is optimal. It is interesting to note that the firm’s 
optimal strategy is to always offer two FUT plans (PH, 
TH) and (PL, TL), regardless of the relative proportions 
of consumers, when the single-crossing assumption 
does not hold: 
𝑃𝐻 = 𝑈𝐻 
𝑇𝐻 = 𝐿𝐻 
𝑃𝐿 = 𝑈𝐿 
𝑇𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿 
Proposition 2 (without single-crossing property, 
𝑼𝑯
𝑳𝑯
≤
𝑼𝑳
𝑳𝑳
): 
Regardless of the relative proportions of 
consumers, the optimal strategy for the firm is to 
always offer two FUT plans: (PH, TH) = (𝑈𝐻, 𝐿𝐻) 
and (PL, TL) = (𝑈𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿). 
While Masuda and Whang (2006) show that the 
structure of a FUT plan is optimal, we still do not know 
what the optimal FUT plan is when the single-crossing 
assumption does not hold. To our knowledge, 
Proposition 2 is the first that theoretically shows the 
optimality of FUT pricing without the strong single-
crossing assumption, and it is thus proposed to be a 
useful contribution to the pricing literature. 
So far, we have assumed LH > LL. To further 
understand the role that the maximum consumption-
level bound plays in FUT pricing, it is interesting to 
investigate the case in which LH = L = LL. When 
consumers have the same maximum consumption-
level bound, both Figures 1 and 2 will actually 
converge to Figure 3; accordingly, the optimal solution 
will converge to the following proposition (by 
replacing LH = LL = L in Proposition 1).  
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Figure 3. The Same Maximum Consumption-Level Bound 
 
Proposition 3 (when consumers have the same 
maximum consumption-level bound):  
When α is small enough, so that: −𝛼𝑈𝐻 + 𝑈𝐿 ≥ 0, 
the optimal strategy for the firm is to offer flat rate 
pricing P = UL to accommodate both consumer 
types. Otherwise, the firm should offer flat rate 
pricing 𝑃 = 𝑈𝐻 to accommodate high-type 
consumers only. 
Extending Masuda and Whang (2006), the analyses from 
our base model suggest that the maximum consumption-
level bounds play a critical role in FUT pricing. 
Specifically, the value of Proposition 3 is that (together 
with Propositions 1 and 2) it demonstrates the pivotal role 
that the maximum consumption-level bound plays in 
FUT pricing. If consumers have different maximum 
consumption-level bounds, even without the single-
crossing assumption, FUT pricing is still a more 
profitable strategy. However, if consumers have the same 
maximum consumption-level bounds, even with the 
different utility function slopes  
𝑈𝐻
𝐿
>
𝑈𝐿
𝐿
, offering flat rate 
pricing would be optimal. While the insight from our base 
model is most likely to hold in the case of multiple types 
of consumers (which is still useful for offering guidance 
on how to design an optimal FUT strategy), in practice, 
the actual implementation of the model and decisions on 
how many plans to offer and at what prices when there 
are more than two types of consumers, can be 
challenging. Indeed, a pricing problem of this sort (when 
there are more than two consumer types) can be very 
complicated and is usually not solvable in closed-form, 
even when imposing the very restrictive single-crossing 
property (which ensures that consumers can be sorted). 
However, in reality, consumer types can easily go beyond 
two types and consumers can have very different utility 
functions. To address this void, in the following section 
we extend our base model to accommodate more than two 
types of consumers, and we address some practical 
constraints commonly observed in practice in order to 
guide firms on deciding whether, when, and how to 
effectively use FUT pricing to market their information 
services under many practical scenarios and parameters, 
specifically: (1) consumer heterogeneity and various 
consumer preferences, (2) incomplete information, and 
(3) efficiency loss compared to three-part tariff and 
nonlinear pricing. 
4. The General Model 
In practice, many information service providers offer 
FUT pricing menu from which consumers can choose. 
For example, Gogo Inflight Internet offers the following 
menu options: $5 (1-hour), $16 (24-hour domestic), $28 
(24-hour global), and $59.95 (unlimited monthly). 
Carnival Cruise Line offers a Wi-Fi service on its cruise 
ships with the following options: $159 (480 minutes), $89 
(240 minutes), $59 (120 minutes), and $29 (45 minutes). 
Neither of these companies allow over-the-limit usage 
beyond the preselected plan. Our general model is 
constructed from the information service provider’s 
viewpoint by considering J different plans for I consumer 
types (market segments). The decision problem of 
information service providers is determining how many 
plans to offer and how to price these plans in order to 
maximize profits, subject to consumer participation and 
incentive compatibility constraints.  
Table 1 lists the notations used to model FUT pricing as 
a mixed integer nonlinear program. Note that Si and Xij are 
not the decision variables of the information service 
provider, but of the equilibrium outcome and decision 
variables of the consumers. They are called “Intermediate 
Variables” in Table 1 because we incorporate the 
consumers’ surplus optimization decisions as constraints 
in our models. Accordingly, although they are not the 
decision variables of the information service provider, 
they are still treated as the optimization arguments in our 
model. 
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Table 1. Model Notations 
Given Parameters 
C: System capacity. To maintain a reasonable service quality, the information service provider must set the largest aggregate demand 
the system can handle. It is defined as a multiple of the largest individual demand possible. 
F: Marginal menu cost if the information service provider adds one more plan to the pricing menu. 
I: The market has I types of consumers. 
J: The information service provider is considering J different possible plans. 
Li: Maximum consumption-level bound for consumer type i. It is defined as a percentage of the largest individual demand. 
Mj: Marginal cost, if any, of providing plan j to a consumer. 
Ni: Number of type i consumers. 
Tj: Plan units for plan j. It is defined as a percentage of the largest individual demand possible. 
Uij: The utility a type i consumer can get from plan j.  
Decision Variables or Intermediate Variables 
Pj: Price for plan j. 
Si: Consumer surplus for consumer type i. 
Xij: A decision variable. 1 if consumer type i chooses to buy plan j, and zero otherwise. 
Yj: A decision variable. 1 if the information service provider chooses to offer plan j, and zero otherwise. 
Also note that in our model, we do not consider the 
service provider’s initial fixed cost of providing the 
service to each consumer, as this kind of one-time 
expense may not be as important as a monthly fee, 
considering the long-term relationship between the 
service provider and its subscribers. This is, perhaps, the 
reason that virtually all wireless service providers offer 
free or discounted phones to attract new consumers. 
Similarly, we do not consider the initial cost incurred for 
the consumer to initially enroll in the information service, 
such as the purchase of high-end 4G mobile devices in 4G 
LTE wireless service scenarios. In any case, this one-time 
fee actually does not affect the optimization problem 
because it can be easily absorbed by the consumer’s 
utility function. The decision problem of information 
service providers is as follows:
 
( )  
= = =
−−
Ii Jj Jj
jijjji
YXSP
FYXMPN
jijij , . . . ,1 , . . . ,1 , . . . ,1,,,
max
                                    (1) 
s.t. 
( )
=
−=
Jj
ijjiji XPUS
,...,1
,     i = 1,…,I                                                    (2) 
( ) jjiji YPUS − ,              i = 1,…,I; j = 1,…,J                                        (3) 
( ) 0− ijjij XPU ,             i = 1,…,I; j = 1,…,J                                        (4) 
1
,...,1

= Jj
ijX ,                      i = 1,…,I                                                                   (5) 
jij YX  ,                           i = 1,…,I; j = 1,…,J                                                (6) 
CTXN
Ii Jj
jiji  
= =,...,1 ,...,1
                                                                                (7) 
( ) jij
i
j YUP max
,             j = 1,…,J                                                             (8) 
0jP ,                              j = 1,…,J                                                                         (9) 
0iS ,                              i = 1,…,I                                                              (10) 
ijX = 0 or 1,                      i = 1,…,I; j = 1,…,J                                       (11) 
jY = 0 or 1,                        j = 1,…,J.                                                             (12) 
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The objective function (1) maximizes the total net 
profit of the information service provider. This is 
calculated by the summation of profits obtained from 
each type of consumer minus the menu cost (if any) 
incurred by the information service provider. Note that 
information service providers may incur a positive 
marginal cost Mj (either a fixed cost or a variable cost 
depending on the plan units) for their information 
services. A fixed marginal cost might mean that a firm 
would have the same processing and operational costs 
to collect money in each period from each consumer, 
regardless of service plan, while a variable marginal 
cost might mean that there is a positive monitoring cost 
for the service provider to keep track of consumer 
usage that increases according to the number of plan 
units.  
The following constraints are imposed: Constraint (2) 
defines consumer surplus as the difference between 
consumer i’s utility and the price of her chosen plan. 
Constraint (3) ensures that consumers will maximize 
their consumer surplus Si when choosing their plans. 
This can be done by ensuring that the consumer surplus 
from a customer’s chosen plan is higher than or equal 
to the consumer surplus from any other plan offered by 
the information service provider (incentive 
compatibility constraints). Constraint (4) ensures that 
consumers only choose a plan with a nonnegative 
surplus (individual rationality constraints), i.e., if Pj > 
Uij, then Xij cannot be 1. Constraint (5) ensures that all 
consumers choose one plan at most. Constraint (6) 
ensures that consumers can only choose plans that are 
offered by the (monopolist) information service 
provider. Constraint (7) ensures that in order to 
maintain a reasonable quality of service, the largest 
aggregate demand the system could possibly handle is 
within the system’s capacity. Note that while system 
capacity is defined as a multiple of the largest 
individual demand possible, the plan units for different 
plans considered by the service provider (Tj) and the 
maximum consumption-level bounds for different 
consumer types (Li) are defined as percentages of the 
largest individual demand possible. For example, for a 
time-based information service (e.g., voice 
communication), the largest individual demand 
possible could be 24 hours multiplied by 30 days per 
month. Please note that 100% of the largest individual 
demand possible is actually equivalent to unlimited 
usage in the context of flat rate pricing as this is the 
ultimate upper bound of any individual demand. 
Constraint (8) sets an upper bound on plan price. It is 
unreasonable to set a price that no consumer is 
interested in paying. Constraints (9) and (10) are 
nonnegativity constraints for plan price and consumer 
surplus. Finally, Constraints (11) and (12) enforce the 
integer property of the decision variables with respect 
to consumer choices and plan offerings.  
Please note that the consumer utility will stay the same 
beyond the bound Li ; thus, Li is actually captured by 
Uij. As a result, while Constraints (2) to (4) would 
ensure that each consumer will purchase the best plan 
for him or herself, the service provider only needs to 
keep track of consumer usage and disable the service 
when the purchased plan units are used up. Thus, 
mathematically, we do not need a constraint to enforce 
Li separately. 
To successfully solve an optimization problem 
analytically, we must basically resort to differentiation. 
However, this is generally limited to cases where the 
function is differentiable. In our objective function, we 
have 0-1 integer decision variables even in a product 
term with another continuous decision variable, which 
makes it nonlinear and nondifferentiable. Together 
with the constraints the objective function is subject to, 
it is not feasible to derive a closed-form solution for 
our MINLP. In fact, MINLP has traditionally been 
categorized as among the most difficult programs to 
solve by operations research scholars. In order to solve 
this complicated mixed integer nonlinear program for 
Equations 1-12, we formulated the model in GAMS 
format and we used the BARON solver on the NEOS 
Server (http://neos.mcs.anl.gov). The computational 
results are presented below. 
5. Numerical Results and Case 
Analyses 
Generally speaking, it is difficult, if not completely 
impossible, to derive the optimal FUT menu options 
analytically with more than two consumer types, even 
with the single-crossing assumption. One of the major 
contributions of our numerical solution approach is 
that our general model can accommodate multiple 
types of consumers without any auxiliary consumer 
utility assumption. While we can analytically show the 
pivotal role of the maximum consumption-level 
bounds in FUT pricing and derive an optimal FUT 
pricing menu under the condition of two types of 
consumers even without the single-crossing 
assumption (base model), we adopt a numerical 
solution approach to test the generalizability of our 
base model and explore more realistic settings without 
any assumptions to examine the optimal structure of 
FUT pricing and its relative performance effects (firm 
profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare) as 
compared to the more popular flat rate pricing under 
different conditions. We consider two forms of 
consumer heterogeneity: First, following our base 
model, we still assume that consumers may have 
different maximum consumption-level bounds 
(captured by parameter Li). Second, we assume that 
consumers may have different utility distributions 
across the information service (e.g., uniform 
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distributions with different parameters). This is 
basically the same as consumers having different 
slopes for their utility functions in our base model. By 
having different maximum consumption-level bounds 
and utility distributions across the service, these 
assumptions implicitly assume the consumers may 
have different budget constraints, which is a realistic 
assumption in practice. 
5.1. A Detailed Illustrative Example: In-
Flight Internet Connection  
As an example, we consider the case of an airline 
wanting to provide in-flight Internet services on one of 
its long-distance routes. In this example, we first 
randomly generate a test example and use it to 
demonstrate how an optimal FUT pricing menu can be 
a profitable alternative to flat rate pricing.  
The major assumptions and parameters used in this 
example are listed below: 
System capacity C is assumed to be 500 times the 
largest individual demand possible. In the case of in-
flight Internet, the largest individual demand possible 
would be the total duration of the flight, i.e., it is 
possible that some consumers may use the in-flight 
Internet connection throughout the entire duration of 
the flight. 
The marginal menu cost F is assumed to be 500 units. 
In other words, the airline may face a trade-off between 
offering more plans to possibly capture more consumer 
types and confusing consumers with too many plans. 
We assume five consumer types (I = 5) on the flight, 
and assume the airline considers 10 different plans (J 
= 10) with plan units at 10% increments (T1 = 10%, T2 
= 20%, T3 = 30%, T4 = 40%, T5 = 50%, T6 = 60%, T7 = 
70%, T8 = 80%, T9 = 90%, and T10 = 100%) of the 
largest individual demand possible (the duration of the 
flight) respectively.4 
Maximum consumption-level bounds for each 
consumer type are randomly generated between 1% 
and 100% of the largest individual demand possible 
(flight duration) with L1 = 36%, L2 = 83%, L3 = 61%, 
L4 = 26% and L5 = 63% (i.e., Consumer Type 2 are 
heavy users while Consumer Type 4 are lighter users). 
Marginal cost of providing different plans to the 
consumers Mj is assumed to be negligible. 
The number of consumers within each type on the 
flight is assumed to be equal with N1 = 100, N2 = 100, 
N3 = 100, N4 = 100 and N5 = 100. 
The utility that a type i consumer can derive from plan 
j, Uij, is randomly generated as follows: For Consumer 
Type 1, since L1 = 36%, we first randomly generated 
36 numbers between 1 and 10, and then sorted them in 
a descending fashion to represent Consumer Type 1’s 
utility for the first 36% of the largest individual 
demand possible. We then accumulated the utility 
values to get Consumer Type 1’s utility function. We 
assume utility will stay the same beyond bound L1 = 
36%. We did the same to generate the utility functions 
for the other four consumer types to clearly indicate a 
diminishing marginal utility.  
As seen in Table 2 and Figure 4, the single-crossing 
assumption, which was required in Masuda and Whang 
(2006) to derive the closed form solution, is violated at 
several places in this example. 
 
Table 2. The Utility that Consumer Type i Can Get from Plan j 
 Consumer Type 1 Consumer Type 2 Consumer Type 3 Consumer Type 4 Consumer Type 5 
Plan 1 (10%) 87 91 93 88 96 
Plan 2 (20%) 146 171 169 139 183 
Plan 3 (30%) 181 242 232 149 254 
Plan 4 (40%) 187 306 277 149 308 
Plan 5 (50%) 187 359 305 149 345 
Plan 6 (60%) 187 394 317 149 369 
Plan 7 (70%) 187 418 318 149 372 
Plan 8 (80%) 187 428 318 149 372 
Plan 9 (90%) 187 431 318 149 372 
Plan 10 (100%) 187 431 318 149 372 
 
4  Due to the computer resource limits enforced on the 
BARON solver on the NEOS Server we used 
(http://neos.mcs.anl.gov), we mostly test the cases when the 
firm is considering only ten different plans with 10% 
increment. In real life cases, more prudential firms could 
certainly use a commercial BARON solver and try 20 plans 
with 5% increment or even 100 plans with 1% increment. 
Valuable insights could still be gained even with this setting.   
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Figure 4. Utility Functions of Different Consumer Types  
 
5.1.1. Flat Rate Pricing Strategy 
When a firm offers flat rate pricing to a consumer in 
order to attract a given consumer type, the flat rate 
should not be higher than this consumer type’s highest 
utility. For example, to sell the service to Consumer 
Type 1 in our example, the flat rate of the service 
should not be higher than 187 units. Also, because we 
assume that all consumers within a market segment 
have the same utility function, the demand curve is a 
step function and the possible optimal values of the flat 
rate are 187, 431, 318, 149, and 372 units. To find the 
optimal flat rate for the service, we simply compute 
and compare all profits that can be derived from these 
possible values of the flat rate. Given the particular 
setting described above, the airline would offer the 
service at 318 units. This price point would offer the 
highest profit level for the airline at 94,900 units, and 
Consumer Types 2, 3, and 5 would buy the service 
while Consumer Types 1 and 4 would not purchase the 
service. 
5.1.2. Optimal FUT Pricing Strategy 
However, given these parameters, can the airline do 
better by offering a FUT menu? If so, how many plans 
should it offer? At what plan units and prices? 
We formulated the model for this test example and 
solved it using the BARON solver on the NEOS 
Server, and found the optimal FUT pricing menu: the 
airline should offer four plans—Plans 2, 5, 6, and 10, 
priced at 139, 275, 299, and 336 units, respectively. 
With this FUT menu offering, our model predicts that 
Consumer Types 1 and 4 will buy Plan 2, Consumer 
Type 3 will buy Plan 5, Consumer Type 5 will buy Plan 
6, and Consumer Type 2 will continue to buy the 
highest-end plan (Plan 10). Note that with multiple 
plans, the airline can raise the price of its highest-end, 
all-you-can-use plan (Plan 10, 100%) from 318 to 336 
units (but not more than 336 units, so that this plan 
remains attractive compared to other plans), and 
Consumer Types 1 and 4 are predicted to now enter the 
market by buying the lowest-end plan offered (results 
are shown in Table 3). The profit level achieved with 
optimal FUT pricing is now 116,800 units (versus 
94,900 for flat rate pricing), or 23.08% more than the 
highest net profit when only flat rate pricing was 
offered. 
5.1.3. Social Welfare 
Based on this example, optimal FUT pricing has two 
social welfare implications. First, the firm can increase 
profits by using optimal FUT pricing. In this case, 
profit improvements come from two sources: market 
expansion (i.e., Consumer Types 1 and 4 will now 
purchase the service) and a higher price for the highest-
end plan (i.e., Consumer Type 2 is willing to pay 
more). Although revenues from Consumer Types 3 and 
5 decrease because they select cheaper plans in this 
scenario, any revenue loss is compensated by higher 
revenues from the other consumer types. Second, 
optimal FUT pricing can reduce deadweight loss by 
accommodating more consumers in the market, thus 
resulting in higher consumer surplus. In this case, total 
consumer surplus increases by 20.96% and total social 
welfare increases by 22.76%; accordingly, the airline 
earns more and more consumers enjoy the benefits of 
the information service. In other words, optimal FUT 
pricing can be a “win-win” situation for both the firm 
and its consumers, enhancing social surplus. 
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Table 3. Flat Rate Pricing versus Optimal FUT Pricing 
 Consumer 
Type 1 
Consumer 
Type 2 
Consumer 
Type 3 
Consumer 
Type 4 
Consumer 
Type 5 
Flat Rate Pricing Strategy Not Buy Buy Buy Not Buy Buy 
Optimal FUT Pricing Strategy Buy Plan 2 Buy Plan 10 Buy Plan 5 Buy Plan 2 Buy Plan 6 
5.2. Consumer Heterogeneity and 
Preferences on Optimal FUT Pricing 
To account for consumer heterogeneity and consumer 
preferences, we examine the efficiency gains due to 
optimal FUT pricing (versus flat rate pricing) for 
different consumer preferences. Since no archival data 
are readily available, we rely on randomly generated 
data in our numerical experiments. Similar to our 
detailed example earlier, we first assume that there are 
five groups of consumers (I = 5) comprising 100 
people each; all consumers in each group have 
homogeneous preferences, and the firm is still 
considering ten different plans (J = 10). We compare 
the performance of different pricing schemes by 
changing the shape of the consumer utility functions: 
maximum consumption-level bounds for each 
consumer type (Li) and parameters for the per-percent-
usage utility distribution. Note that we use U(a,b) to 
denote a uniform distribution over the interval [a,b]. 
Specifically, we use these parameters to randomly 
generate Uij (the utility that a type i consumer can get 
from plan j), similar to our example. Again, we assume 
that the marginal menu cost F is 500, and the marginal 
cost of providing different plans to consumers Mj is 0. 
First, we consider the case when consumers have 
different maximum consumption-level bounds (Li), 
even though their utilities are drawn from the same 
utility distribution (and may have similar utility 
function slope). 
We hold the distribution fixed (uniform) and show 
results for three, four, and five different consumer 
segments (in which each segment is characterized by 
different values of Li) (Table 4). To preserve the 
similarity to our detailed example, we still consider 10 
possible plans and assume there are 100 consumers for 
each type (i.e., if there are three values for Li, there are 
300 consumers). We average the results of 10 
randomly generated instances for each case. As shown 
in Table 4, when consumers have different maximum 
consumption-level bounds but the same utility 
distribution, there are firm profit and social welfare 
improvements derived from using the optimal FUT 
pricing strategy, even though consumer surplus is not 
always improved. Flat rate pricing requires the price 
offered for the single all-you-can-use plan to be kept 
relatively low to attract more consumers (lower price 
→ more consumers); otherwise, the service provider 
would only target high-end consumers (higher price → 
fewer consumers). By using optimal FUT pricing, the 
service provider can offer multiple plans to maximize 
consumers inclusion in the market; thus, firm profit 
and social welfare can both increase substantially. 
We then examine cases in which different consumer 
types have different consumer utility distributions only 
(i.e., consumers may have different utility function 
slopes). Specifically, all consumer types have the same 
Li, and utilities for different consumer types are 
randomly drawn from different utility distributions. 
 
Table 4. Heterogeneous Consumer Types: Different Li, Identical Utility Distribution 
 L1 = 33%, L2 = 67% 
L3 = 100% 
L1 = 25%, L2 = 50% 
L3 = 75%, L4 = 100% 
L1 = 20%, L2 = 40% 
L3 = 60%, L4 = 80% 
L5 = 100% 
Consumer’s utility for each percent usage U (1,10) U (1,10) U (1,10) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. no. of plans offered by optimal FUT pricing 3 3.8 4.3 
Avg. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
StDev. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
124.20% 
(3.22%) 
129.73% 
(3.78%) 
127.19% 
(5.15%) 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
StDev. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
62.41% 
(13.19%) 
106.99% 
(42.61%) 
134.42% 
(114.27%) 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
StDev. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
110.94% 
(3.04%) 
122.87% 
(11.78%) 
120.60% 
(12.51%) 
Table 5. Heterogeneous Consumer Types: Identical Li, Different Utility Distributions 
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 U (9,10); U (7,8)  
U (5,6) 
U (9,10); U (7,8) 
U (5,6); U (3,4) 
U (9,10); U (7,8) 
U (5,6); U (3,4) 
U (1,2) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Maximum consumption-level bound Li 50% 50% 50% 
Avg. no. of plans offered by optimal FUT pricing 1 1 1 
Avg. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
StDev. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
StDev. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
StDev. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
Interestingly, as shown in Table 5, when different 
consumer types have different utility distributions but 
the same Li, optimal FUT pricing does no better than 
flat rate pricing, which is consistent with our base 
model results. However, when different consumer 
types have different Li and different utility 
distributions (Table 6), optimal FUT pricing strategy 
once again outperforms flat rate pricing in terms of 
firm profit and social welfare, sometimes at the 
expense of a lower consumer surplus. This suggests 
that the heterogeneity in Li plays a critical role in the 
performance of the optimal FUT pricing strategy. 
Thus, we empirically observe:  
Finding 1: Following our base model results, in terms 
of the optimal FUT pricing scheme, the 
heterogeneity of the maximum consumption-
level bound is more important than the 
heterogeneity of the consumer utility distribution 
(the slope of the utility function). 
Differences in Li enable a clear separation of consumer 
types, and thus support price discrimination with 
different usage plans; however, the same is not true for 
differences in utility distribution (utility function 
slope) in which a separation of types through nonlinear 
pricing is less feasible. For consumer types with 
different Li, optimal FUT pricing strategy dominates 
flat rate pricing strategy in terms of both firm profits 
and social welfare, regardless of whether the utilities 
are randomly drawn from the same or different 
distributions in our examples.  
To further study the role of Li, we randomly draw both 
Li and utilities of each percent usage and repeat the 
same comparison for different pricing schemes. In 
other words, we first randomly pick an integer Li 
between 1 and 100 for each consumer type, and then 
generate Li random numbers from U(1,10) to represent 
utilities for the first Li percent of the largest individual 
demand possible of each consumer type. We then 
accumulate them to get each consumer type’s utility 
function. Again, we assume utility stays the same 
beyond bound Li and 10 randomly generated instances 
were averaged for each case, as shown in Table 7. 
Table 6. Heterogeneous Consumer Types: Different Li and Different Utility Distributions 
 
L1 = 33%; L2 = 67% 
L3 = 100%; U(9,10) 
U (7,8); U (5,6) 
 
L1 = 25%; L2 = 50% 
L3 = 75%; L4 = 100% 
U (9,10); U (7,8) 
U (5,6); U (3,4) 
 
L1 = 20%; L2 = 40% 
L3 = 60%; L4 = 80% 
L5 = 100%; U(9,10) 
U (7,8); U (5,6) 
U (3,4); U (1,2) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. no. of plans offered by optimal FUT pricing 3 2 2 
Avg. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
StDev. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
135.08% 
(1.12%) 
122.02% 
(0.22%) 
122.05% 
(0.45%) 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
StDev. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
4.20% 
(5.34%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
100.00% 
(0.00%) 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
StDev. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
128.99% 
(0.26%) 
120.34% 
(0.14%) 
120.34% 
(0.20%) 
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Table 7. Improvement of FUT Pricing Strategy (Uniform Distributed Li) 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Consumer’s utility for each percent usage U(1,10) U(1,10) U(1,10) 
No. of consumer types I 3 4 5 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. no. of plans offered by optimal FUT pricing 2.6 3 3.2 
Avg. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
StDev. (FUT profit / Flat rate profit) 
112.62% 
(8.08%) 
116.94% 
(12.63%) 
119.39% 
(15.03%) 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
StDev. (FUT consumer surplus / Flat rate consumer surplus) 
137.81% 
(124.44%) 
112.29% 
(50.27%) 
133.17% 
(82.78%) 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
StDev. (FUT social welfare / Flat rate social welfare) 
106.00% 
(8.41%) 
112.29% 
(7.45%) 
112.21% 
(10.01%) 
As shown in Table 7, if consumers differ in their 
maximum consumption-level bound Li, offering them 
several FUT plans is much more profitable than flat 
rate pricing. The profit improvement of optimal FUT 
pricing comes both from market expansion (by serving 
more consumer types) and also from price 
discrimination (by offering different plans and prices 
for different consumer types). In our examples, both 
average consumer surplus and social welfare improve 
with optimal FUT pricing. By selling to more 
consumers, deadweight loss is reduced and social 
welfare increases. When there are only a few different 
consumer types, deadweight loss may be small. Again, 
this shows that FUT pricing is profit-enhancing and 
socially efficient when consumers have different 
maximum consumption-level bounds.  
5.3. Incomplete Information on Optimal 
FUT Pricing  
Our base model shows how an information service 
provider may design an optimal FUT pricing menu 
when consumer utilities are known ex ante, even 
without the single-crossing property. Our general 
model also shows how optimal FUT pricing may be 
used by the information service provider to increase its 
profits and social welfare. Nevertheless, in practice, 
service providers seldom understand consumer utilities 
perfectly, and this uncertainty is, at most, generally 
captured by some consumer utility distribution 
forecasts. How can a firm hence take advantage of 
optimal FUT pricing when all it has is distribution 
forecasts of these parameter values? While it is 
reasonable for a service provider to predict utility 
distributions, acquiring exact consumer utility values 
is likely to be much costlier. The question that 
naturally arises is how much is perfect information 
about consumer utility worth? Conversely, does 
incomplete information concerning consumer utility 
really matter? 
Our numerical solution approach based on our general 
model enables us to investigate this question directly 
by considering the three cases in Table 6. For each case 
in Table 6, we drew random utilities for each percent 
usage and used these values to determine an optimal 
FUT pricing menu. The process was repeated 10 times 
for each case. As a result, for each case in Table 6, ten 
FUT menus were derived. For each of these ten menus, 
we then drew another 10 sets of random utilities and 
applied the predetermined FUT menu to the new data 
to assess performance. We chose the most profitable 
FUT menu among these 10 menus and determined its 
average profit against 10 new sets of random utilities, 
denoted as FUT2. We used these 10 new sets of 
random utilities as given parameters to derive the 
optimal FUT profits, denoting the average profit from 
these 10 instances as FUT1. Accordingly, FUT1 
represents the optimal average profit when the FUT 
pricing menu is set after consumer utilities are known 
(i.e., perfect information of exact utilities), whereas 
FUT2 represents the realized average profit when the 
FUT menu is set before consumer utilities are known 
(i.e., incomplete information of exact utilities). We 
conducted similar calculations for flat rate pricing, and 
the best average profit against those 10 utility sets used 
in both FUT1 and FUT2 is designated as FLATRATE. 
We express the performance comparison as a fraction 
of FUT1 profits (perfect information, FUT pricing) 
because FUT1 profits represent the highest possible 
profits under all schemes and conditions we 
considered. These comparisons are summarized in 
Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Relative Profits under Incomplete Information 
 Case 1 in Table 6 Case 2 in Table 6 Case 3 in Table 6 
FUT2/FUT1 93.26 % 96.11 % 94.40 % 
FLATRATE/FUT1 72.85 % 80.25 % 80.23 % 
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As shown in the “FUT2/FUT1” row of Table 8, 
although incomplete information is clearly costly, the 
predetermined FUT pricing menu can reasonably 
approximate the optimal average profit achievable 
when consumer utilities are known beforehand. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 8, flat rate pricing 
suffers more from incomplete information than FUT 
pricing does (smaller fractions of the optimal average 
profit achievable with perfect information FUT1). 
Hence, FUT pricing is still the better choice, even with 
incomplete information. The finding that FUT pricing 
suffers less from incomplete information than flat rate 
pricing does suggests that FUT pricing is an attractive 
pricing strategy when there is uncertainty about 
consumer utilities, which, in practice, is commonly the 
case.   
Finding 2: FUT pricing performs better than flat rate 
pricing under incomplete information scenarios. 
Moreover, compared to FUT pricing, flat rate 
pricing suffers more from incomplete 
information. 
5.4. Efficiency Loss Compared to Three-
part Tariff and Nonlinear Pricing 
Thus far, following Masuda and Whang (2006), we 
have assumed that all consumers will stay within the 
amount of allowed usage units in their chosen plans 
most of the time in both our base and our general 
models. Masuda and Whang argue that over-the-limit 
rates do not play a critical role as long as they are high 
enough. A practical question to extend Masuda and 
Whang is: Should firms treat over-the-limit rates as 
decision variables (i.e., should they employ a “three-
part tariff” comprising plan price, plan allotment, and 
over-the-limit rate)? Also, how do FUT pricing and 
three-part tariffs perform compared to a nonlinear 
pricing scheme where each usage level is charged a 
different and nonlinear price? While it is difficult to 
answer these research questions analytically, our 
numerical solution approach allows us to examine 
them directly. We first construct the model for the 
three-part tariff pricing problem (Table 9 defines our 
notations): 
  
Table 9. Model Notations for Three-Part Tariff and Nonlinear Pricing 
Parameters 
C: System capacity. To maintain a reasonable service quality, the information service provider must set the largest aggregate 
demand the system can handle. It is defined as a multiple of the largest individual demand possible. 
F: Marginal menu cost if the information service provider adds one more plan to the menu. 
I: The market has I types of consumers. 
J: The information service provider is considering J different possible plans. 
Li: Maximum consumption-level bound for consumer type I, defined as a percentage of the largest individual demand possible. 
Mk: Marginal cost, if any, of providing k % of the largest individual demand possible of the information service to a consumer. 
Ni: Number of type i consumers. 
Tj: Plan units for plan j. It is defined as a percentage of the largest individual demand possible. 
Uik: The utility a type i consumer can get from consuming k percent of the largest individual demand possible of the information 
service.  
Decision Variables or Intermediate Variables 
Oj: Over-the-limit rate for plan j, i.e. the unit price for each additional percent of usage over Tj when the consumer chooses plan 
j. 
Pj: Price for plan j. 
Rk: Given all plans offered by the information service provider, the most economical rate the consumer must pay for consuming 
k% of the largest individual demand possible of the information service, including the plan price and the over-the-limit charge, 
if any.  
Si: Consumer surplus for consumer type i. 
Xik: The decision variable which is one if consumer type i chooses to consume k % of the largest individual demand possible of 
the information service, and zero otherwise. 
Yj: A decision variable; one if the information service provider chooses to offer plan j, and zero otherwise. 
Zjk: The decision variable which is one if Rk is defined/calculated by plan j, and zero otherwise. 
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The objective function (Equation 1) maximizes the 
total net profit of the information service provider. 
This is calculated by the sum of profits obtained from 
each consumer type minus the menu cost, if any, 
incurred by the provider. The following constraints are 
imposed: Constraint (2) defines consumer surplus as 
the difference between consumer i’s utility and the 
most economical rate of her chosen consumption level. 
Constraint (3) ensures that consumers will maximize 
their consumer surplus Si when choosing their 
consumption levels. Constraint (4) ensures that 
consumers only choose a consumption level with a 
nonnegative surplus (individual rationality 
constraints), i.e., if Rk > Uik, then Xik cannot be 1. 
Constraint (5) ensures that all consumers choose one 
consumption level at most. Constraints (6-1) ~ (6-J) 
define the most economical rate the consumer must 
pay for consuming k percent of the largest individual 
demand possible of the information service as either 
“the plan price of one of the plans with plan units 
greater than or equal to k” or “the plan price plus any 
over-the-limit charge of one of the plans with plan 
units smaller than or equal to k.” Constraints (7-1) ~ 
(7-J) ensure that given all plans offered by the service 
provider (those with Yj = 1), the most economical rate 
the consumer must pay for consuming k percent of the 
largest individual demand possible of the information 
service must be smaller than or equal to the plan prices 
of those plans with plan units greater than or equal to 
k, while constraints (8-1) ~ (8-J-1) ensure that given all 
plans offered by the provider (those with Yj = 1), the 
most economical rate the consumer must pay for 
consuming k percent of the largest individual demand 
possible of the information service must be smaller 
than or equal to the plan price, plus any over-the-limit 
charge of those plans with plan units smaller than or 
equal to k. Constraint (9) ensures that the most 
economical rate the consumer must pay for consuming 
k percent of the largest individual demand possible of 
the information service is defined by exactly one plan, 
defined by constraints (6-1) ~ (6-J). Constraint (10) 
ensures that the most economical rate the consumer 
must pay for consuming k percent of the largest 
individual demand possible of the information service 
can only be defined by those plans offered by the 
provider. Constraint (11) ensures that to maintain a 
reasonable quality of service, the largest aggregate 
demand the system could possibly handle is within the 
system’s capacity. Constraints (12) ~ (15) are upper 
and lower bounds for the over-the-limit rate, plan 
price, usage rate, and consumer surplus. Basically, the 
largest consumer utility forms the upper bounds of 
these decision variables. Finally, constraints (16) ~ 
(18) enforce the integer property of the decision 
variables with respect to consumer choices, plan 
offerings and rate definition/calculation. 
We also construct the model for nonlinear pricing in 
which each possible usage level is charged a different 
(nonlinear) price. This is actually a much simplified 
version of the three-part tariff, achieved by removing 
the menu cost term in the objective function and 
removing constraints (6) ~ (10), (12), (13), (17) and 
(18):
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Similar to our earlier formulation, we consider cases 
when consumers have different maximum 
consumption-level bounds (Li), even though their 
utilities are drawn from the same utility distribution. 
Specifically, we hold the distribution fixed (uniform) 
and show results below for 3, 4, and 5 different 
consumer segments (in which each segment is 
characterized by different values of Li). We still 
assume 100 consumers for each type (i.e., if there are 
3 values for Li, there are 300 consumers), and the firm 
still considers ten different plans (J = 10). To have a 
fair comparison, we assume the marginal menu cost to 
be 0 for all pricing schemes. We average the results of 
10 randomly generated instances for each case as the 
original formulation. Due to the complexity of the 
three-part tariff model and the computer resource 
limits enforced by the BARON solver on the NEOS 
Server (http://neos.mcs.anl.gov), we could only test 
cases allowing consumers to choose consumption 
levels at 5% increments (i.e., 5%, 10%, 15%,..., 
100%), rather than, for example, 1% increments. 
However, valuable insights are still available in the 
context of this setting.  
We first compare the firm profits, consumer surplus, 
and social welfare of flat rate pricing and FUT pricing 
versus a three-part tariff. As shown in Table 10, FUT 
performs almost equally well as the three-part tariff 
context in terms of firm profits and consumer surplus. 
However, because the consumer surplus makes up a 
smaller relative portion, FUT generates about the same 
social welfare as the three-part tariff. In other words, 
from both the firm and society point of view, treating 
over-the-limit rates as decision variables may not be 
necessary, especially given the additional complexities 
associated with a three-part tariff. We also notice that 
in the optimal three-part tariff design, setting high 
over-the-limit rates as a penalty to discourage over-
the-limit usage may not be necessary and, as a result, 
consumers do sometimes overuse. 
Finding 3: While FUT pricing may leave higher 
consumer surplus, FUT pricing performs almost 
equally well relative to the three-part tariff, in 
terms of both (a) firm profits and (b) social 
welfare.  
Finding 4: Treating over-the-limit rates as decision 
variables may not be necessary in terms of FUT 
pricing and the three-part tariff. 
Finding 5: In the optimal three-part tariff design, 
setting high over-the-limit rates as a penalty to 
discourage over-the-limit usage may not be 
necessary and as a result, consumers do 
sometimes overuse. 
We also compare firm profits, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare of flat rate pricing, FUT pricing, and 
three-part tariff versus nonlinear pricing. As shown in 
Table 11, FUT pricing and three-part tariff are both 
reasonably good approximations of nonlinear pricing 
in terms of both firm profit and social welfare. 
Therefore: 
Finding 6: Both FUT pricing and three-part tariff are 
reasonably good approximations of nonlinear 
pricing in which each possible usage level is 
charged a different (non-linear) price, in terms of 
both (a) firm profits and (b) social welfare. 
To further test the generalization of our findings, we 
randomly draw both Li [with U(1,100)] and consumer 
utilities [with U(1,10)], and repeat the same 
comparison for different pricing schemes. As shown in 
Tables 12 and 13, our Findings 3-6 are still supported, 
even when both Li and consumer utilities are randomly 
generated. As a result, we have a certain degree of 
confidence that our findings are generalizable. 
 
Table 10. Efficiency Loss of Flat Rate and FUT Schemes Compared to Three-Part Tariff Pricing 
 L1 = 33%, L2 = 67% 
L3 = 100% 
 
L1 = 25%, L2 = 50% 
L3 = 75%, L4 = 100% 
 
L1 = 20%, L2 = 40% 
L3 = 60%, L4 = 80% 
L5 = 100% 
Consumer’s utility for each 5% usage U(1,10) U(1,10) U(1,10) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. (Flat rate profit / Three-part tariff profit) 78.09% 77.51% 76.19% 
Avg. (Flat rate consumer surplus / Three-part tariff consumer surplus) 308.42% 226.06% 236.37% 
Avg. (Flat rate social welfare / Three-part tariff social welfare) 90.76% 90.77% 88.90% 
Avg. (FUT profit / Three-part tariff profit) 99.94% 100.00% 99.92% 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Three-part tariff consumer surplus) 123.66% 97.67% 111.99% 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Three-part tariff social welfare) 100.78% 99.96% 100.55% 
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Table 11. Efficiency Loss of Flat Rate, FUT, and Three-Part Tariff Schemes Compared to Nonlinear Pricing 
 L1 = 33%, L2 = 67% 
L3 = 100% 
L1 = 25%, L2 = 50% 
L3 = 75%, L4 = 100% 
L1 = 20%, L2 = 40% 
L3 = 60%, L4 = 80% 
L5 = 100% 
Consumer’s utility for each 5% usage U(1,10) U(1,10) U(1,10) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. (Flat rate profit / Nonlinear profit) 77.79% 77.27% 75.66% 
Avg. (Flat rate consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 226.91% 231.50% 198.11% 
Avg. (Flat rate social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 89.43% 90.66% 87.04% 
Avg. (FUT profit / Nonlinear profit) 99.55% 99.67% 99.23% 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 96.06% 99.81% 92.45% 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 99.23% 99.84% 98.41% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff profit / Nonlinear profit) 99.61% 99.67% 99.30% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 88.33% 102.64% 83.72% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 98.51% 99.89% 97.87% 
Table 12. Efficiency Loss of Flat Rate and FUT Schemes Compared to Three-Part Tariff Pricing 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Consumer’s utility for each 5% usage U(1,10) U(1,10) U(1,10) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. (Flat rate profit / Three-part tariff profit) 86.17% 85.60% 84.31% 
Avg. (Flat rate consumer surplus / Three-part tariff consumer surplus) 196.54% 178.36% 128.86% 
Avg. (Flat rate social welfare / Three-part tariff social welfare) 94.78% 92.37% 88.66% 
Avg. (FUT profit / Three-part tariff profit) 100.00% 99.87% 99.49% 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Three-part tariff consumer surplus) 98.13% 96.02% 100.86% 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Three-part tariff social welfare) 99.66% 99.53% 99.57% 
Table 13. Efficiency Loss of Flat Rate, FUT, and Three-Part Tariff Schemes Compared to Nonlinear Pricing 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Consumer’s utility for each 5% usage U(1,10) U(1,10) U(1,10) 
No. of total consumers 300 400 500 
No. of plans considered J 10 10 10 
Avg. (Flat rate profit / Nonlinear profit) 85.57% 83.71% 82.93% 
Avg. (Flat rate consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 190.68% 183.27% 189.08% 
Avg. (Flat rate social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 94.24% 90.48% 88.16% 
Avg. (FUT profit / Nonlinear profit) 99.37% 97.69% 97.86% 
Avg. (FUT consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 92.60% 200.81% 120.31% 
Avg. (FUT social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 99.06% 97.47% 99.00% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff profit / Nonlinear profit) 99.37% 97.81% 98.19% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff consumer surplus / Nonlinear consumer surplus) 94.60% 203.73% 115.53% 
Avg. (Three-part tariff social welfare / Nonlinear social welfare) 99.40% 97.85% 98.93% 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1. Contributions and Implications for 
Theory and Research 
To survive in today’s challenging information 
economy, firms must be creative in designing their 
pricing strategies for information services. Many 
service providers charge a flat rate for their services. 
For example, most, if not all, cable TV firms charge a 
flat monthly fee. Google has employed flat rate pricing 
for its SaaS services. Google Apps is free for the Basic 
Edition, but it charges a flat price of $50 per year for 
its Premier Edition. While popular flat rate pricing has 
been studied extensively in the literature and has been 
shown to be generally superior to usage-based pricing 
(in fact, traditional two-part tariffs that charge a 
subscription fee are increasingly infrequently observed 
in practice), it may not be the optimal pricing scheme 
in terms of firm profits and social welfare. While flat 
rate pricing encourages unlimited consumption, thus 
challenging capacity constraints, FUT pricing is an 
emerging pricing scheme increasingly used by 
information service providers, such as mobile 
providers in the US, that prevents unlimited 
consumption and capacity constraints. However, prior 
research has not prescribed how information service 
providers should strategically use FUT pricing. 
Accordingly, extending the literature on the pricing of 
information services, our paper aims to fill this gap by 
examining the optimal design of FUT pricing and 
contributing not only to the literature on information 
services, but also to practice in terms of optimally 
pricing information services. Our study makes the 
following contributions along with their corresponding 
implications:  
First, in our base model, we relax the strict single-
crossing assumption and derive the optimal FUT menu 
when they are two types of consumers. By using mixed 
integer nonlinear programming (MINLP), our general 
model helps firms determine their optimal FUT pricing 
menu for information services (i.e., what plans to offer 
and what prices to charge). Our general model 
accommodates any number of heterogeneous 
consumer types and any utility functions—something 
infeasible by using analytical approaches. By 
comparing the firm profits, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare of two of the most popular pricing 
schemes for information services, FUT and flat rate 
pricing, under various real-life consumer preference 
scenarios that are often difficult to examine 
analytically, this study helps us determine when FUT 
pricing is a better option and by how much. This 
information is more important than simply knowing 
whether FUT pricing is better in theory because, in 
practice, FUT menu pricing is generally more difficult 
to implement than flat rate pricing. 
Second, this study offers a set of propositions and 
empirical findings that enhance our understanding of 
FUT pricing. For example, our analytical and 
numerical results both indicate that, when it comes to 
optimal FUT pricing, the maximum consumption-level 
bound is more important than the slope of the 
consumer utility functions. In our examples, regardless 
of utility functions, if consumers have different 
maximum consumption-level bounds, FUT pricing 
clearly dominates flat rate pricing and enhances social 
welfare. Our study invokes interesting practical 
implications because it is relatively cheaper and easier 
to ask a real-life consumer whether he or she positively 
values an additional percent usage or for how many 
units he or she is willing to pay, than to ask a consumer 
for his or her exact utility of service usage. Simply put, 
the amount of a service a consumer is interested in is 
much easier and cheaper to acquire by firms in 
practice, than is the consumer’s entire utility function.  
Third, with our numerical FUT pricing model, we can 
study the efficiency loss due to incomplete information 
and identify the optimal pricing scheme under different 
incomplete information conditions. Incomplete 
information has not been adequately studied in the 
literature on the pricing of information services, 
perhaps because of the difficulty to analytically derive 
a model without numerical solutions. Our analyses 
show that flat rate pricing suffers more from 
incomplete information than FUT pricing, and FUT 
pricing still performs better than flat rate pricing even 
if the exact consumer utilities are unknown. This 
finding demonstrates that FUT pricing is still effective 
under incomplete information scenarios, which occur 
frequently in practice.  
Fourth, our numerical solution approach also allows us 
to study whether firms should treat over-the-limit rates 
as decision variables. Our analyses show that FUT 
pricing performs almost equally well as three-part 
tariff pricing, in terms of both firm profit and social 
welfare, and they are both reasonably good 
approximations of the nonlinear pricing in which each 
possible usage level is charged a different nonlinear 
price, in terms of both firm profit and social welfare. 
In summary, these findings suggest that treating over-
the-limit rates as decision variables in the optimization 
problem may not be necessary in practice. 
Finally, our research also contributes by extending the 
literature on the pricing of information goods (e.g., 
digital songs, movies, books, or news), in which every 
unit is different, and the pricing of information services 
(e.g., Internet services, mobile services, or 
SMS/MMS), in which every unit is identical. 
Traditionally, academics and managers have treated 
the pricing of information goods and information 
services differently. Indeed, they often focus on either 
the pricing of information goods (e.g., Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1999; Chuang & Sirbu, 1999; Hitt & 
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Chen, 2005; Varian, 2000; Wu, Hitt, Chen, & 
Anandalingam, 2008; Wu & Chen, 2008; Schlereth & 
Skiera, 2012) or the pricing of information services 
(e.g., Essegaier et al., 2002; Masuda & Whang, 2006; 
Schlereth, Stepanchuk, & Skiera, 2010; Chen & Wu, 
2013), but do not examine both categories together. 
This distinct treatment is also evident in practice. 
While FUT pricing is a popular choice in the context 
of information services (like mobile phone services), 
there are far fewer similar pricing practices for 
information goods (such as digital songs, digital games, 
apps). However, we would like to point out that 
customized bundle pricing in the context of any 
information goods (Hitt & Chen, 2005; Wu et al., 
2008) is, in practice, very similar to FUT pricing in the 
context of information services. Accordingly, 
customized bundle pricing is a pricing strategy that 
allows consumers to select a fixed number of different 
information goods of their own choice from the pool 
of goods offered for a fixed price, while FUT pricing 
allows consumers to select a fixed amount of identical 
information service units for a fixed price. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to point out this important 
similarity that brings together these two distinct 
pricing schemes (pricing of information services and 
pricing of information goods). In doing so, we aim at 
opening new avenues for these two traditionally 
distinct pricing schemes to learn from each other.   
6.2. Contributions and Implications for 
Practice 
This research also makes a managerial contribution by 
helping firms better price their information services. 
For example, our study shows that Internet service 
providers (ISPs) can potentially increase their profit 
levels with optimal FUT pricing. Some Internet addicts 
may be online constantly, whereas others may only use 
the Internet sporadically. In other words, consumers 
have very different maximum consumption-level 
bounds. The current subscription approach (flat rate 
pricing) adopted by most ISPs may inevitably exclude 
many light users from the market. Our analyses 
suggest that when consumers differ in the maximum 
consumption-level bound, FUT pricing is more 
efficient in terms of both firm profit and social welfare. 
These findings have clear and actionable implications 
for firms to strategically market their information 
services in different contexts.  
Our model can help managers design optimal FUT 
pricing menus for their information services, offering 
guidance on what plans to offer and what prices to 
charge. Prudent managers could evaluate the 
performance of their candidate FUT pricing menu 
against many simulated parameter estimates before 
actually adopting any FUT menu. Based on the law of 
large numbers, when many test samples are used, the 
“average” will be close to the true mean and the 
variance will decrease as the number of runs increases. 
These average results can give managers good 
insights/guidelines on how well their predetermined 
FUT menus will perform and what profit levels they 
can expect in the end. We reused the three best FUT 
menus from Table 6 to demonstrate this idea. 
Specifically, we performed 10,000 test runs, 
respectively, and the improvements in average profits, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare (compared to flat 
rate pricing) are shown in Figure 5. As Figure 5 
reveals, the average results converge very well as the 
number of runs increases, suggesting that useful 
insights can be gained and that these predetermined 
FUT menus perform well in the end. Again, these 
findings offer specific guidance to managers to help 
them better price their information services. 
While it is generally assumed that the utility function 
of each consumer type is known in the literature (e.g., 
Masuda & Whang, 2006), and we assume the 
knowledge of the utility of each percent usage in our 
test examples, our assumption does not need to be 
stricter, since the utility of each percent usage can be 
easily derived if the whole utility function is known. 
Furthermore, while for each consumer type in our test 
examples, we use the same utility distribution for each 
percent usage for the convenience of generating 
random percent usage utilities (to randomly construct 
the whole utility function), using utility distribution for 
each percent usage is not a necessary assumption in our 
model. Also, we can certainly use different 
distributions on different parts of the utility function. 
In fact, our model can essentially accommodate any 
utility function, with or without using a utility 
distribution for each percent usage. In some cases, the 
same type of consumers may not have exactly the same 
maximum consumption-level bound Li and percent 
usage utility estimates, even though these values are 
drawn from the same distributions. Thus, same type of 
consumers may make different surplus optimization 
decisions and our model can still accommodate them 
as different types. In other words, we can assume we 
have 
= Ii
iN
,...,1
different types of consumers with only 
one consumer in each type. Firms can then randomly 
draw the parameter values from their distributions to 
represent consumers and accordingly run the model to 
derive the optimal solution (shown above).  
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Figure 5. Average Results Converge as the Number of Runs Increases 
 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
This study shows that FUT menu pricing is a 
promising pricing scheme for information services in 
practice. As shown in our numerical examples, optimal 
FUT pricing can even be a “win-win” situation for both 
the firm (in terms of firm profits) and its customers (in 
terms of consumer surplus). We cover multiple 
practical scenarios for FUT pricing (consumer 
heterogeneity and preferences, incomplete 
information, and efficiency loss) to advance the 
literature on the pricing of information services. In 
doing so, we hope not only to extend Masuda and 
Whang’s (2006) theoretical analysis of FUT pricing 
(which was restricted to the single-crossing 
assumption) to more practical, real-world applications 
that can inform managerial practice, but we also aim to 
entice future research to further explore the potential 
of FUT pricing in several other contexts to potentially 
maximize social welfare by helping firms increase 
their profits, by helping consumers enhance their 
surplus, and by helping society avoid deadweight loss 
from the suboptimal pricing of information services.
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Appendix A: Additional Analyses  
A1. Marginal Menu Cost and Optimal FUT Pricing  
In the paper, we assumed negligible marginal menu cost when offering multiple service plans to consumers. To relax 
this assumption, we investigate the relationship between the number of optimal FUT plans and the marginal menu cost 
F. To perform this analysis, we consider a case with the following parameters:  
I = 5, J = 10, L1 = 20%, L2 = 40%, L3 = 60%, L4 = 80%, L5 = 100%, Mj = 0, Ni = 100. 
The consumer percent usage utilities are randomly drawn from U(1,10), as before. We fix all random utilities generated 
throughout the analysis but gradually increase the marginal menu cost F from 0 to 20,000. As shown in Table A1, 
when there is zero marginal menu cost, offering different plans to all consumer types is optimal. However, as the 
marginal menu cost increases (both in terms of possible firm’s overhead cost and also in terms of possible cognitive 
overload for consumers), the optimal number of FUT plans offered decreases, as expected. It is interesting to note that 
the number of optimal FUT plans tends to be relatively small as the marginal menu cost increases (dropping from five 
to two). Moreover, when the marginal menu cost is very high, flat rate pricing (plan 10, 100%) is the only viable plan.  
Finding 1: The number of optimal FUT plans decreases and tends to be relatively small as the marginal menu cost 
increases. When the marginal menu cost is very high, flat rate pricing is the only viable plan. 
Table A1. Relationship of the Number of Optimal FUT Plans and the Marginal Menu Cost 
 F = 0 F = 5000 F = 10000 F = 15000 F = 20000 
No. of optimal FUT plans offered 5 2 2 2 1 
Profit improvement from flat rate pricing to optimal FUT 
pricing 
28.14% 17.16% 12.14% 6.46% 0.00% 
Consumer surplus improvement from flat rate pricing to 
optimal FUT pricing 
402.27% 243.18% 243.18% 220.45% 0.00% 
Social welfare improvement from flat rate pricing to 
optimal FUT pricing 
45.14% 28.00% 23.85% 17.97% 0.00% 
A2. Marginal Cost and Optimal FUT Pricing  
In the main paper, we assumed a negligible marginal cost Mj when offering a plan to a consumer. Relaxing this 
assumption, we examine the relationship between the number of optimal FUT plans and marginal cost Mj. Specifically, 
we reuse the same parameters and random utilities generated in the previous subsection. However, we fix the marginal 
menu cost F at zero, while changing the marginal cost. We consider two types of marginal cost Mj: variable marginal 
cost for each plan, which is dependent on plan units Tj, and fixed marginal cost for each plan, which is independent of 
plan units Tj.  
We first consider the case when marginal cost for each plan is fixed (Mf) regardless of units in the plan (Table A2). 
For example, this could correspond to the case when it costs the same processing and operational cost to collect money 
in each period from each consumer, regardless of service plan. As shown earlier, when the marginal cost is negligible, 
service providers would be willing to offer several FUT plans. Nonetheless, when fixed marginal cost is high, service 
providers have less incentive to provide small size plans. Therefore, as shown in Table A2, when fixed marginal cost 
increases, the number of optimal FUT plans decreases. 
Because of this finding, FUT pricing excludes consumers with small utilities, which negatively affects consumer 
surplus and total social welfare. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in this particular case, FUT pricing is quite 
robust and constantly outperforms flat rate pricing in terms of profits, even when fixed marginal cost is high. As fixed 
marginal cost increases further (last column of Table A2), service providers are willing to offer only flat rate pricing 
because this is the only profitable plan, while service providers can still use flat rate pricing to extract all consumer 
surplus (i.e., zero consumer surplus as indicated by N.A.) for very high fixed marginal cost.  
Finding 2: If marginal cost is dominated by a fixed component, then, as marginal cost increases, the number of optimal 
FUT plans decreases.  
Finding 3: Facing fixed marginal cost, FUT pricing is quite robust as it constantly outperforms flat rate pricing in 
terms of profits, even when the fixed marginal cost is high. 
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Table A2. Relationship of the Number of Optimal FUT Plans and the Fixed Marginal Cost 
 Mf = 0 Mf = 100  Mf = 200  Mf = 300  Mf = 400  Mf = 500  
No. of optimal FUT plans offered 5 2 2 2 2 1 
Profit improvement from flat rate pricing to optimal 
FUT pricing 
28.14% 4.83% 4.96% 8.02% 20.97% 0.00% 
Consumer surplus improvement from flat rate pricing 
to optimal FUT pricing 
402.27% 177.27% -59.09% -59.09% -59.09% N.A. 
Social welfare improvement from flat rate pricing to 
optimal FUT pricing 
45.14% 14.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
We also examine the case when the marginal cost increases with the plan units Tj. This may correspond to cases like 
in-flight phone services provided by airlines. We consider the same case as analyzed in Table A2, but now the marginal 
cost is a function of Tj. As shown in Table A3, our results show that the performance of flat rate pricing is sensitive to 
per-unit marginal cost. Flat rate pricing performs significantly worse than FUT pricing, even with small per-unit 
marginal cost. This may explain why airlines do not offer unlimited in-flight phone calls. On the other hand, the number 
of optimal FUT plans is not sensitive to per-unit marginal cost, even when the per-unit marginal cost is high. 
Nevertheless, when the per-unit marginal cost increases further, the demands for larger plans become negligible (since 
the price for large plans will be too high or the service provider will not offer them at all). Besides, when variable 
marginal cost is over or equal to 5Tj in this case, flat rate pricing is no longer viable, with negligible firm profits, 
consumer surplus and total social welfare (the last column of Table A3). 
Table A3. Relationship of the Number of Optimal FUT Plans and Variable Marginal Cost 
 Mj = 0Tj  Mj = 1Tj Mj = 2Tj Mj = 3Tj Mj = 4Tj Mj = 5Tj 
No. of optimal FUT plans offered 5 4 4 3 3 3 
Profit improvement from flat rate pricing to optimal 
FUT pricing 
28.14% 32.04% 45.04% 80.56% 259.68% 5283.33% 
Consumer surplus improvement from flat rate pricing 
to optimal FUT pricing 
402.27% 170.45% 170.45% 70.45% -47.73% N.A. 
Social welfare improvement from flat rate pricing to 
optimal FUT pricing 
45.14% 39.97% 54.75% 79.35% 179.17% 5633.33% 
Finding 4: Flat rate pricing is very sensitive to per-unit marginal cost. Flat rate pricing performs significantly worse 
than FUT pricing, even with small per-unit marginal cost.  
Finding 5: The number of optimal FUT plans is not very sensitive to the per-unit marginal cost. 
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